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						| Back | Federalist 
						No. 34 The Same Subject Continued: 
						Concerning the General Power of Taxation - From the New 
						York Packet. Friday, January 4, 1788.
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				| Author: Alexander Hamilton 
 To the People of the State of New York:
 
 I FLATTER myself it has been clearly shown in my last number 
				that the particular States, under the proposed Constitution, 
				would have COEQUAL authority with the Union in the article of 
				revenue, except as to duties on imports. As this leaves open to 
				the States far the greatest part of the resources of the 
				community, there can be no color for the assertion that they 
				would not possess means as abundant as could be desired for the 
				supply of their own wants, independent of all external control. 
				That the field is sufficiently wide will more fully appear when 
				we come to advert to the inconsiderable share of the public 
				expenses for which it will fall to the lot of the State 
				governments to provide.
 
 To argue upon abstract principles that this co-ordinate 
				authority cannot exist, is to set up supposition and theory 
				against fact and reality. However proper such reasonings might 
				be to show that a thing OUGHT NOT TO EXIST, they are wholly to 
				be rejected when they are made use of to prove that it does not 
				exist contrary to the evidence of the fact itself. It is well 
				known that in the Roman republic the legislative authority, in 
				the last resort, resided for ages in two different political 
				bodies not as branches of the same legislature, but as distinct 
				and independent legislatures, in each of which an opposite 
				interest prevailed: in one the patrician; in the other, the 
				plebian. Many arguments might have been adduced to prove the 
				unfitness of two such seemingly contradictory authorities, each 
				having power to ANNUL or REPEAL the acts of the other. But a man 
				would have been regarded as frantic who should have attempted at 
				Rome to disprove their existence. It will be readily understood 
				that I allude to the COMITIA CENTURIATA and the COMITIA TRIBUTA. 
				The former, in which the people voted by centuries, was so 
				arranged as to give a superiority to the patrician interest; in 
				the latter, in which numbers prevailed, the plebian interest had 
				an entire predominancy. And yet these two legislatures coexisted 
				for ages, and the Roman republic attained to the utmost height 
				of human greatness.
 
 In the case particularly under consideration, there is no such 
				contradiction as appears in the example cited; there is no power 
				on either side to annul the acts of the other. And in practice 
				there is little reason to apprehend any inconvenience; because, 
				in a short course of time, the wants of the States will 
				naturally reduce themselves within A VERY NARROW COMPASS; and in 
				the interim, the United States will, in all probability, find it 
				convenient to abstain wholly from those objects to which the 
				particular States would be inclined to resort.
 
 To form a more precise judgment of the true merits of this 
				question, it will be well to advert to the proportion between 
				the objects that will require a federal provision in respect to 
				revenue, and those which will require a State provision. We 
				shall discover that the former are altogether unlimited, and 
				that the latter are circumscribed within very moderate bounds. 
				In pursuing this inquiry, we must bear in mind that we are not 
				to confine our view to the present period, but to look forward 
				to remote futurity. Constitutions of civil government are not to 
				be framed upon a calculation of existing exigencies, but upon a 
				combination of these with the probable exigencies of ages, 
				according to the natural and tried course of human affairs. 
				Nothing, therefore, can be more fallacious than to infer the 
				extent of any power, proper to be lodged in the national 
				government, from an estimate of its immediate necessities. There 
				ought to be a CAPACITY to provide for future contingencies as 
				they may happen; and as these are illimitable in their nature, 
				it is impossible safely to limit that capacity. It is true, 
				perhaps, that a computation might be made with sufficient 
				accuracy to answer the purpose of the quantity of revenue 
				requisite to discharge the subsisting engagements of the Union, 
				and to maintain those establishments which, for some time to 
				come, would suffice in time of peace. But would it be wise, or 
				would it not rather be the extreme of folly, to stop at this 
				point, and to leave the government intrusted with the care of 
				the national defense in a state of absolute incapacity to 
				provide for the protection of the community against future 
				invasions of the public peace, by foreign war or domestic 
				convulsions? If, on the contrary, we ought to exceed this point, 
				where can we stop, short of an indefinite power of providing for 
				emergencies as they may arise? Though it is easy to assert, in 
				general terms, the possibility of forming a rational judgment of 
				a due provision against probable dangers, yet we may safely 
				challenge those who make the assertion to bring forward their 
				data, and may affirm that they would be found as vague and 
				uncertain as any that could be produced to establish the 
				probable duration of the world. Observations confined to the 
				mere prospects of internal attacks can deserve no weight; though 
				even these will admit of no satisfactory calculation: but if we 
				mean to be a commercial people, it must form a part of our 
				policy to be able one day to defend that commerce. The support 
				of a navy and of naval wars would involve contingencies that 
				must baffle all the efforts of political arithmetic.
 
 Admitting that we ought to try the novel and absurd experiment 
				in politics of tying up the hands of government from offensive 
				war founded upon reasons of state, yet certainly we ought not to 
				disable it from guarding the community against the ambition or 
				enmity of other nations. A cloud has been for some time hanging 
				over the European world. If it should break forth into a storm, 
				who can insure us that in its progress a part of its fury would 
				not be spent upon us? No reasonable man would hastily pronounce 
				that we are entirely out of its reach. Or if the combustible 
				materials that now seem to be collecting should be dissipated 
				without coming to maturity, or if a flame should be kindled 
				without extending to us, what security can we have that our 
				tranquillity will long remain undisturbed from some other cause 
				or from some other quarter? Let us recollect that peace or war 
				will not always be left to our option; that however moderate or 
				unambitious we may be, we cannot count upon the moderation, or 
				hope to extinguish the ambition of others. Who could have 
				imagined at the conclusion of the last war that France and 
				Britain, wearied and exhausted as they both were, would so soon 
				have looked with so hostile an aspect upon each other? To judge 
				from the history of mankind, we shall be compelled to conclude 
				that the fiery and destructive passions of war reign in the 
				human breast with much more powerful sway than the mild and 
				beneficent sentiments of peace; and that to model our political 
				systems upon speculations of lasting tranquillity, is to 
				calculate on the weaker springs of the human character.
 
 What are the chief sources of expense in every government? What 
				has occasioned that enormous accumulation of debts with which 
				several of the European nations are oppressed? The answers 
				plainly is, wars and rebellions; the support of those 
				institutions which are necessary to guard the body politic 
				against these two most mortal diseases of society. The expenses 
				arising from those institutions which are relative to the mere 
				domestic police of a state, to the support of its legislative, 
				executive, and judicial departments, with their different 
				appendages, and to the encouragement of agriculture and 
				manufactures (which will comprehend almost all the objects of 
				state expenditure), are insignificant in comparison with those 
				which relate to the national defense.
 
 In the kingdom of Great Britain, where all the ostentatious 
				apparatus of monarchy is to be provided for, not above a 
				fifteenth part of the annual income of the nation is 
				appropriated to the class of expenses last mentioned; the other 
				fourteen fifteenths are absorbed in the payment of the interest 
				of debts contracted for carrying on the wars in which that 
				country has been engaged, and in the maintenance of fleets and 
				armies. If, on the one hand, it should be observed that the 
				expenses incurred in the prosecution of the ambitious 
				enterprises and vainglorious pursuits of a monarchy are not a 
				proper standard by which to judge of those which might be 
				necessary in a republic, it ought, on the other hand, to be 
				remarked that there should be as great a disproportion between 
				the profusion and extravagance of a wealthy kingdom in its 
				domestic administration, and the frugality and economy which in 
				that particular become the modest simplicity of republican 
				government. If we balance a proper deduction from one side 
				against that which it is supposed ought to be made from the 
				other, the proportion may still be considered as holding good.
 
 But let us advert to the large debt which we have ourselves 
				contracted in a single war, and let us only calculate on a 
				common share of the events which disturb the peace of nations, 
				and we shall instantly perceive, without the aid of any 
				elaborate illustration, that there must always be an immense 
				disproportion between the objects of federal and state 
				expenditures. It is true that several of the States, separately, 
				are encumbered with considerable debts, which are an excrescence 
				of the late war. But this cannot happen again, if the proposed 
				system be adopted; and when these debts are discharged, the only 
				call for revenue of any consequence, which the State governments 
				will continue to experience, will be for the mere support of 
				their respective civil list; to which, if we add all 
				contingencies, the total amount in every State ought to fall 
				considerably short of two hundred thousand pounds.
 
 In framing a government for posterity as well as ourselves, we 
				ought, in those provisions which are designed to be permanent, 
				to calculate, not on temporary, but on permanent causes of 
				expense. If this principle be a just one our attention would be 
				directed to a provision in favor of the State governments for an 
				annual sum of about two hundred thousand pounds; while the 
				exigencies of the Union could be susceptible of no limits, even 
				in imagination. In this view of the subject, by what logic can 
				it be maintained that the local governments ought to command, in 
				perpetuity, an EXCLUSIVE source of revenue for any sum beyond 
				the extent of two hundred thousand pounds? To extend its power 
				further, in EXCLUSION of the authority of the Union, would be to 
				take the resources of the community out of those hands which 
				stood in need of them for the public welfare, in order to put 
				them into other hands which could have no just or proper 
				occasion for them.
 
 Suppose, then, the convention had been inclined to proceed upon 
				the principle of a repartition of the objects of revenue, 
				between the Union and its members, in PROPORTION to their 
				comparative necessities; what particular fund could have been 
				selected for the use of the States, that would not either have 
				been too much or too little too little for their present, too 
				much for their future wants? As to the line of separation 
				between external and internal taxes, this would leave to the 
				States, at a rough computation, the command of two thirds of the 
				resources of the community to defray from a tenth to a twentieth 
				part of its expenses; and to the Union, one third of the 
				resources of the community, to defray from nine tenths to 
				nineteen twentieths of its expenses. If we desert this boundary 
				and content ourselves with leaving to the States an exclusive 
				power of taxing houses and lands, there would still be a great 
				disproportion between the MEANS and the END; the possession of 
				one third of the resources of the community to supply, at most, 
				one tenth of its wants. If any fund could have been selected and 
				appropriated, equal to and not greater than the object, it would 
				have been inadequate to the discharge of the existing debts of 
				the particular States, and would have left them dependent on the 
				Union for a provision for this purpose.
 
 The preceding train of observation will justify the position 
				which has been elsewhere laid down, that ``A CONCURRENT 
				JURISDICTION in the article of taxation was the only admissible 
				substitute for an entire subordination, in respect to this 
				branch of power, of State authority to that of the Union.'' Any 
				separation of the objects of revenue that could have been fallen 
				upon, would have amounted to a sacrifice of the great INTERESTS 
				of the Union to the POWER of the individual States. The 
				convention thought the concurrent jurisdiction preferable to 
				that subordination; and it is evident that it has at least the 
				merit of reconciling an indefinite constitutional power of 
				taxation in the Federal government with an adequate and 
				independent power in the States to provide for their own 
				necessities. There remain a few other lights, in which this 
				important subject of taxation will claim a further 
				consideration.
 
 PUBLIUS.
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