| Author: James Madison 
 To the People of the State of New York:
 
 THE Constitution proposed by the convention may be considered 
				under two general points of view. The FIRST relates to the sum 
				or quantity of power which it vests in the government, including 
				the restraints imposed on the States. The SECOND, to the 
				particular structure of the government, and the distribution of 
				this power among its several branches. Under the FIRST view of 
				the subject, two important questions arise: 1. Whether any part 
				of the powers transferred to the general government be 
				unnecessary or improper? 2. Whether the entire mass of them be 
				dangerous to the portion of jurisdiction left in the several 
				States? Is the aggregate power of the general government greater 
				than ought to have been vested in it? This is the FIRST 
				question. It cannot have escaped those who have attended with 
				candor to the arguments employed against the extensive powers of 
				the government, that the authors of them have very little 
				considered how far these powers were necessary means of 
				attaining a necessary end. They have chosen rather to dwell on 
				the inconveniences which must be unavoidably blended with all 
				political advantages; and on the possible abuses which must be 
				incident to every power or trust, of which a beneficial use can 
				be made. This method of handling the subject cannot impose on 
				the good sense of the people of America. It may display the 
				subtlety of the writer; it may open a boundless field for 
				rhetoric and declamation; it may inflame the passions of the 
				unthinking, and may confirm the prejudices of the misthinking: 
				but cool and candid people will at once reflect, that the purest 
				of human blessings must have a portion of alloy in them; that 
				the choice must always be made, if not of the lesser evil, at 
				least of the GREATER, not the PERFECT, good; and that in every 
				political institution, a power to advance the public happiness 
				involves a discretion which may be misapplied and abused. They 
				will see, therefore, that in all cases where power is to be 
				conferred, the point first to be decided is, whether such a 
				power be necessary to the public good; as the next will be, in 
				case of an affirmative decision, to guard as effectually as 
				possible against a perversion of the power to the public 
				detriment. That we may form a correct judgment on this subject, 
				it will be proper to review the several powers conferred on the 
				government of the Union; and that this may be the more 
				conveniently done they may be reduced into different classes as 
				they relate to the following different objects: 1. Security 
				against foreign danger; 2. Regulation of the intercourse with 
				foreign nations; 3. Maintenance of harmony and proper 
				intercourse among the States; 4. Certain miscellaneous objects 
				of general utility; 5. Restraint of the States from certain 
				injurious acts; 6. Provisions for giving due efficacy to all 
				these powers. The powers falling within the FIRST class are 
				those of declaring war and granting letters of marque; of 
				providing armies and fleets; of regulating and calling forth the 
				militia; of levying and borrowing money. Security against 
				foreign danger is one of the primitive objects of civil society. 
				It is an avowed and essential object of the American Union. The 
				powers requisite for attaining it must be effectually confided 
				to the federal councils. Is the power of declaring war 
				necessary? No man will answer this question in the negative. It 
				would be superfluous, therefore, to enter into a proof of the 
				affirmative. The existing Confederation establishes this power 
				in the most ample form. Is the power of raising armies and 
				equipping fleets necessary? This is involved in the foregoing 
				power. It is involved in the power of self-defense. But was it 
				necessary to give an INDEFINITE POWER of raising TROOPS, as well 
				as providing fleets; and of maintaining both in PEACE, as well 
				as in war? The answer to these questions has been too far 
				anticipated in another place to admit an extensive discussion of 
				them in this place. The answer indeed seems to be so obvious and 
				conclusive as scarcely to justify such a discussion in any 
				place. With what color of propriety could the force necessary 
				for defense be limited by those who cannot limit the force of 
				offense? If a federal Constitution could chain the ambition or 
				set bounds to the exertions of all other nations, then indeed 
				might it prudently chain the discretion of its own government, 
				and set bounds to the exertions for its own safety.
 
 How could a readiness for war in time of peace be safely 
				prohibited, unless we could prohibit, in like manner, the 
				preparations and establishments of every hostile nation? The 
				means of security can only be regulated by the means and the 
				danger of attack. They will, in fact, be ever determined by 
				these rules, and by no others. It is in vain to oppose 
				constitutional barriers to the impulse of self-preservation. It 
				is worse than in vain; because it plants in the Constitution 
				itself necessary usurpations of power, every precedent of which 
				is a germ of unnecessary and multiplied repetitions. If one 
				nation maintains constantly a disciplined army, ready for the 
				service of ambition or revenge, it obliges the most pacific 
				nations who may be within the reach of its enterprises to take 
				corresponding precautions.
 
 The fifteenth century was the unhappy epoch of military 
				establishments in the time of peace. They were introduced by 
				Charles VII. of France. All Europe has followed, or been forced 
				into, the example. Had the example not been followed by other 
				nations, all Europe must long ago have worn the chains of a 
				universal monarch. Were every nation except France now to 
				disband its peace establishments, the same event might follow. 
				The veteran legions of Rome were an overmatch for the 
				undisciplined valor of all other nations and rendered her the 
				mistress of the world. Not the less true is it, that the 
				liberties of Rome proved the final victim to her military 
				triumphs; and that the liberties of Europe, as far as they ever 
				existed, have, with few exceptions, been the price of her 
				military establishments. A standing force, therefore, is a 
				dangerous, at the same time that it may be a necessary, 
				provision. On the smallest scale it has its inconveniences. On 
				an extensive scale its consequences may be fatal. On any scale 
				it is an object of laudable circumspection and precaution. A 
				wise nation will combine all these considerations; and, whilst 
				it does not rashly preclude itself from any resource which may 
				become essential to its safety, will exert all its prudence in 
				diminishing both the necessity and the danger of resorting to 
				one which may be inauspicious to its liberties. The clearest 
				marks of this prudence are stamped on the proposed Constitution. 
				The Union itself, which it cements and secures, destroys every 
				pretext for a military establishment which could be dangerous. 
				America united, with a handful of troops, or without a single 
				soldier, exhibits a more forbidding posture to foreign ambition 
				than America disunited, with a hundred thousand veterans ready 
				for combat. It was remarked, on a former occasion, that the want 
				of this pretext had saved the liberties of one nation in Europe. 
				Being rendered by her insular situation and her maritime 
				resources impregnable to the armies of her neighbors, the rulers 
				of Great Britain have never been able, by real or artificial 
				dangers, to cheat the public into an extensive peace 
				establishment. The distance of the United States from the 
				powerful nations of the world gives them the same happy 
				security. A dangerous establishment can never be necessary or 
				plausible, so long as they continue a united people. But let it 
				never, for a moment, be forgotten that they are indebted for 
				this advantage to the Union alone. The moment of its dissolution 
				will be the date of a new order of things. The fears of the 
				weaker, or the ambition of the stronger States, or 
				Confederacies, will set the same example in the New, as Charles 
				VII. did in the Old World. The example will be followed here 
				from the same motives which produced universal imitation there. 
				Instead of deriving from our situation the precious advantage 
				which Great Britain has derived from hers, the face of America 
				will be but a copy of that of the continent of Europe. It will 
				present liberty everywhere crushed between standing armies and 
				perpetual taxes. The fortunes of disunited America will be even 
				more disastrous than those of Europe. The sources of evil in the 
				latter are confined to her own limits. No superior powers of 
				another quarter of the globe intrigue among her rival nations, 
				inflame their mutual animosities, and render them the 
				instruments of foreign ambition, jealousy, and revenge. In 
				America the miseries springing from her internal jealousies, 
				contentions, and wars, would form a part only of her lot. A 
				plentiful addition of evils would have their source in that 
				relation in which Europe stands to this quarter of the earth, 
				and which no other quarter of the earth bears to Europe. This 
				picture of the consequences of disunion cannot be too highly 
				colored, or too often exhibited. Every man who loves peace, 
				every man who loves his country, every man who loves liberty, 
				ought to have it ever before his eyes, that he may cherish in 
				his heart a due attachment to the Union of America, and be able 
				to set a due value on the means of preserving it.
 
 Next to the effectual establishment of the Union, the best 
				possible precaution against danger from standing armies is a 
				limitation of the term for which revenue may be appropriated to 
				their support. This precaution the Constitution has prudently 
				added. I will not repeat here the observations which I flatter 
				myself have placed this subject in a just and satisfactory 
				light. But it may not be improper to take notice of an argument 
				against this part of the Constitution, which has been drawn from 
				the policy and practice of Great Britain. It is said that the 
				continuance of an army in that kingdom requires an annual vote 
				of the legislature; whereas the American Constitution has 
				lengthened this critical period to two years. This is the form 
				in which the comparison is usually stated to the public: but is 
				it a just form? Is it a fair comparison? Does the British 
				Constitution restrain the parliamentary discretion to one year? 
				Does the American impose on the Congress appropriations for two 
				years? On the contrary, it cannot be unknown to the authors of 
				the fallacy themselves, that the British Constitution fixes no 
				limit whatever to the discretion of the legislature, and that 
				the American ties down the legislature to two years, as the 
				longest admissible term. Had the argument from the British 
				example been truly stated, it would have stood thus: The term 
				for which supplies may be appropriated to the army 
				establishment, though unlimited by the British Constitution, has 
				nevertheless, in practice, been limited by parliamentary 
				discretion to a single year. Now, if in Great Britain, where the 
				House of Commons is elected for seven years; where so great a 
				proportion of the members are elected by so small a proportion 
				of the people; where the electors are so corrupted by the 
				representatives, and the representatives so corrupted by the 
				Crown, the representative body can possess a power to make 
				appropriations to the army for an indefinite term, without 
				desiring, or without daring, to extend the term beyond a single 
				year, ought not suspicion herself to blush, in pretending that 
				the representatives of the United States, elected FREELY by the 
				WHOLE BODY of the people, every SECOND YEAR, cannot be safely 
				intrusted with the discretion over such appropriations, 
				expressly limited to the short period of TWO YEARS? A bad cause 
				seldom fails to betray itself. Of this truth, the management of 
				the opposition to the federal government is an unvaried 
				exemplification. But among all the blunders which have been 
				committed, none is more striking than the attempt to enlist on 
				that side the prudent jealousy entertained by the people, of 
				standing armies. The attempt has awakened fully the public 
				attention to that important subject; and has led to 
				investigations which must terminate in a thorough and universal 
				conviction, not only that the constitution has provided the most 
				effectual guards against danger from that quarter, but that 
				nothing short of a Constitution fully adequate to the national 
				defense and the preservation of the Union, can save America from 
				as many standing armies as it may be split into States or 
				Confederacies, and from such a progressive augmentation, of 
				these establishments in each, as will render them as burdensome 
				to the properties and ominous to the liberties of the people, as 
				any establishment that can become necessary, under a united and 
				efficient government, must be tolerable to the former and safe 
				to the latter. The palpable necessity of the power to provide 
				and maintain a navy has protected that part of the Constitution 
				against a spirit of censure, which has spared few other parts. 
				It must, indeed, be numbered among the greatest blessings of 
				America, that as her Union will be the only source of her 
				maritime strength, so this will be a principal source of her 
				security against danger from abroad. In this respect our 
				situation bears another likeness to the insular advantage of 
				Great Britain. The batteries most capable of repelling foreign 
				enterprises on our safety, are happily such as can never be 
				turned by a perfidious government against our liberties. The 
				inhabitants of the Atlantic frontier are all of them deeply 
				interested in this provision for naval protection, and if they 
				have hitherto been suffered to sleep quietly in their beds; if 
				their property has remained safe against the predatory spirit of 
				licentious adventurers; if their maritime towns have not yet 
				been compelled to ransom themselves from the terrors of a 
				conflagration, by yielding to the exactions of daring and sudden 
				invaders, these instances of good fortune are not to be ascribed 
				to the capacity of the existing government for the protection of 
				those from whom it claims allegiance, but to causes that are 
				fugitive and fallacious. If we except perhaps Virginia and 
				Maryland, which are peculiarly vulnerable on their eastern 
				frontiers, no part of the Union ought to feel more anxiety on 
				this subject than New York. Her seacoast is extensive. A very 
				important district of the State is an island. The State itself 
				is penetrated by a large navigable river for more than fifty 
				leagues. The great emporium of its commerce, the great reservoir 
				of its wealth, lies every moment at the mercy of events, and may 
				almost be regarded as a hostage for ignominious compliances with 
				the dictates of a foreign enemy, or even with the rapacious 
				demands of pirates and barbarians. Should a war be the result of 
				the precarious situation of European affairs, and all the unruly 
				passions attending it be let loose on the ocean, our escape from 
				insults and depredations, not only on that element, but every 
				part of the other bordering on it, will be truly miraculous. In 
				the present condition of America, the States more immediately 
				exposed to these calamities have nothing to hope from the 
				phantom of a general government which now exists; and if their 
				single resources were equal to the task of fortifying themselves 
				against the danger, the object to be protected would be almost 
				consumed by the means of protecting them. The power of 
				regulating and calling forth the militia has been already 
				sufficiently vindicated and explained. The power of levying and 
				borrowing money, being the sinew of that which is to be exerted 
				in the national defense, is properly thrown into the same class 
				with it. This power, also, has been examined already with much 
				attention, and has, I trust, been clearly shown to be necessary, 
				both in the extent and form given to it by the Constitution. I 
				will address one additional reflection only to those who contend 
				that the power ought to have been restrained to external 
				taxation by which they mean, taxes on articles imported from 
				other countries. It cannot be doubted that this will always be a 
				valuable source of revenue; that for a considerable time it must 
				be a principal source; that at this moment it is an essential 
				one. But we may form very mistaken ideas on this subject, if we 
				do not call to mind in our calculations, that the extent of 
				revenue drawn from foreign commerce must vary with the 
				variations, both in the extent and the kind of imports; and that 
				these variations do not correspond with the progress of 
				population, which must be the general measure of the public 
				wants. As long as agriculture continues the sole field of labor, 
				the importation of manufactures must increase as the consumers 
				multiply. As soon as domestic manufactures are begun by the 
				hands not called for by agriculture, the imported manufactures 
				will decrease as the numbers of people increase. In a more 
				remote stage, the imports may consist in a considerable part of 
				raw materials, which will be wrought into articles for 
				exportation, and will, therefore, require rather the 
				encouragement of bounties, than to be loaded with discouraging 
				duties. A system of government, meant for duration, ought to 
				contemplate these revolutions, and be able to accommodate itself 
				to them. Some, who have not denied the necessity of the power of 
				taxation, have grounded a very fierce attack against the 
				Constitution, on the language in which it is defined. It has 
				been urged and echoed, that the power ``to lay and collect 
				taxes, duties, imposts, and excises, to pay the debts, and 
				provide for the common defense and general welfare of the United 
				States,'' amounts to an unlimited commission to exercise every 
				power which may be alleged to be necessary for the common 
				defense or general welfare. No stronger proof could be given of 
				the distress under which these writers labor for objections, 
				than their stooping to such a misconstruction. Had no other 
				enumeration or definition of the powers of the Congress been 
				found in the Constitution, than the general expressions just 
				cited, the authors of the objection might have had some color 
				for it; though it would have been difficult to find a reason for 
				so awkward a form of describing an authority to legislate in all 
				possible cases. A power to destroy the freedom of the press, the 
				trial by jury, or even to regulate the course of descents, or 
				the forms of conveyances, must be very singularly expressed by 
				the terms ``to raise money for the general welfare. ''But what 
				color can the objection have, when a specification of the 
				objects alluded to by these general terms immediately follows, 
				and is not even separated by a longer pause than a semicolon? If 
				the different parts of the same instrument ought to be so 
				expounded, as to give meaning to every part which will bear it, 
				shall one part of the same sentence be excluded altogether from 
				a share in the meaning; and shall the more doubtful and 
				indefinite terms be retained in their full extent, and the clear 
				and precise expressions be denied any signification whatsoever? 
				For what purpose could the enumeration of particular powers be 
				inserted, if these and all others were meant to be included in 
				the preceding general power? Nothing is more natural nor common 
				than first to use a general phrase, and then to explain and 
				qualify it by a recital of particulars. But the idea of an 
				enumeration of particulars which neither explain nor qualify the 
				general meaning, and can have no other effect than to confound 
				and mislead, is an absurdity, which, as we are reduced to the 
				dilemma of charging either on the authors of the objection or on 
				the authors of the Constitution, we must take the liberty of 
				supposing, had not its origin with the latter. The objection 
				here is the more extraordinary, as it appears that the language 
				used by the convention is a copy from the articles of 
				Confederation. The objects of the Union among the States, as 
				described in article third, are ``their common defense, security 
				of their liberties, and mutual and general welfare. '' The terms 
				of article eighth are still more identical: ``All charges of war 
				and all other expenses that shall be incurred for the common 
				defense or general welfare, and allowed by the United States in 
				Congress, shall be defrayed out of a common treasury,'' etc. A 
				similar language again occurs in article ninth. Construe either 
				of these articles by the rules which would justify the 
				construction put on the new Constitution, and they vest in the 
				existing Congress a power to legislate in all cases whatsoever.
 
 But what would have been thought of that assembly, if, attaching 
				themselves to these general expressions, and disregarding the 
				specifications which ascertain and limit their import, they had 
				exercised an unlimited power of providing for the common defense 
				and general welfare? I appeal to the objectors themselves, 
				whether they would in that case have employed the same reasoning 
				in justification of Congress as they now make use of against the 
				convention. How difficult it is for error to escape its own 
				condemnation!
 
 PUBLIUS.
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