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						| Back | Federalist 
						No. 50 Periodic Appeals to the 
						People Considered
 From the New York Packet. Tuesday, February 5, 1788.
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				| Author: Alexander Hamilton or James Madison 
 To the People of the State of New York:
 
 IT MAY be contended, perhaps, that instead of OCCASIONAL appeals 
				to the people, which are liable to the objections urged against 
				them, PERIODICAL appeals are the proper and adequate means of 
				PREVENTING AND CORRECTING INFRACTIONS OF THE CONSTITUTION. It 
				will be attended to, that in the examination of these 
				expedients, I confine myself to their aptitude for ENFORCING the 
				Constitution, by keeping the several departments of power within 
				their due bounds, without particularly considering them as 
				provisions for ALTERING the Constitution itself. In the first 
				view, appeals to the people at fixed periods appear to be nearly 
				as ineligible as appeals on particular occasions as they emerge.
 
 If the periods be separated by short intervals, the measures to 
				be reviewed and rectified will have been of recent date, and 
				will be connected with all the circumstances which tend to 
				vitiate and pervert the result of occasional revisions. If the 
				periods be distant from each other, the same remark will be 
				applicable to all recent measures; and in proportion as the 
				remoteness of the others may favor a dispassionate review of 
				them, this advantage is inseparable from inconveniences which 
				seem to counterbalance it. In the first place, a distant 
				prospect of public censure would be a very feeble restraint on 
				power from those excesses to which it might be urged by the 
				force of present motives. Is it to be imagined that a 
				legislative assembly, consisting of a hundred or two hundred 
				members, eagerly bent on some favorite object, and breaking 
				through the restraints of the Constitution in pursuit of it, 
				would be arrested in their career, by considerations drawn from 
				a censorial revision of their conduct at the future distance of 
				ten, fifteen, or twenty years? In the next place, the abuses 
				would often have completed their mischievous effects before the 
				remedial provision would be applied. And in the last place, 
				where this might not be the case, they would be of long 
				standing, would have taken deep root, and would not easily be 
				extirpated. The scheme of revising the constitution, in order to 
				correct recent breaches of it, as well as for other purposes, 
				has been actually tried in one of the States. One of the objects 
				of the Council of Censors which met in Pennsylvania in 1783 and 
				1784, was, as we have seen, to inquire, ``whether the 
				constitution had been violated, and whether the legislative and 
				executive departments had encroached upon each other. '' This 
				important and novel experiment in politics merits, in several 
				points of view, very particular attention. In some of them it 
				may, perhaps, as a single experiment, made under circumstances 
				somewhat peculiar, be thought to be not absolutely conclusive. 
				But as applied to the case under consideration, it involves some 
				facts, which I venture to remark, as a complete and satisfactory 
				illustration of the reasoning which I have employed. First. It 
				appears, from the names of the gentlemen who composed the 
				council, that some, at least, of its most active members had 
				also been active and leading characters in the parties which 
				pre-existed in the State.
 
 Secondly. It appears that the same active and leading members of 
				the council had been active and influential members of the 
				legislative and executive branches, within the period to be 
				reviewed; and even patrons or opponents of the very measures to 
				be thus brought to the test of the constitution. Two of the 
				members had been vice-presidents of the State, and several other 
				members of the executive council, within the seven preceding 
				years. One of them had been speaker, and a number of others 
				distinguished members, of the legislative assembly within the 
				same period.
 
 Thirdly. Every page of their proceedings witnesses the effect of 
				all these circumstances on the temper of their deliberations. 
				Throughout the continuance of the council, it was split into two 
				fixed and violent parties. The fact is acknowledged and lamented 
				by themselves. Had this not been the case, the face of their 
				proceedings exhibits a proof equally satisfactory. In all 
				questions, however unimportant in themselves, or unconnected 
				with each other, the same names stand invariably contrasted on 
				the opposite columns. Every unbiased observer may infer, without 
				danger of mistake, and at the same time without meaning to 
				reflect on either party, or any individuals of either party, 
				that, unfortunately, PASSION, not REASON, must have presided 
				over their decisions. When men exercise their reason coolly and 
				freely on a variety of distinct questions, they inevitably fall 
				into different opinions on some of them. When they are governed 
				by a common passion, their opinions, if they are so to be 
				called, will be the same.
 
 Fourthly. It is at least problematical, whether the decisions of 
				this body do not, in several instances, misconstrue the limits 
				prescribed for the legislative and executive departments, 
				instead of reducing and limiting them within their 
				constitutional places.
 
 Fifthly. I have never understood that the decisions of the 
				council on constitutional questions, whether rightly or 
				erroneously formed, have had any effect in varying the practice 
				founded on legislative constructions. It even appears, if I 
				mistake not, that in one instance the contemporary legislature 
				denied the constructions of the council, and actually prevailed 
				in the contest. This censorial body, therefore, proves at the 
				same time, by its researches, the existence of the disease, and 
				by its example, the inefficacy of the remedy. This conclusion 
				cannot be invalidated by alleging that the State in which the 
				experiment was made was at that crisis, and had been for a long 
				time before, violently heated and distracted by the rage of 
				party. Is it to be presumed, that at any future septennial epoch 
				the same State will be free from parties? Is it to be presumed 
				that any other State, at the same or any other given period, 
				will be exempt from them? Such an event ought to be neither 
				presumed nor desired; because an extinction of parties 
				necessarily implies either a universal alarm for the public 
				safety, or an absolute extinction of liberty. Were the 
				precaution taken of excluding from the assemblies elected by the 
				people, to revise the preceding administration of the 
				government, all persons who should have been concerned with the 
				government within the given period, the difficulties would not 
				be obviated. The important task would probably devolve on men, 
				who, with inferior capacities, would in other respects be little 
				better qualified. Although they might not have been personally 
				concerned in the administration, and therefore not immediately 
				agents in the measures to be examined, they would probably have 
				been involved in the parties connected with these measures, and 
				have been elected under their auspices.
 
 PUBLIUS.
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