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						| Back | Federalist 
						No. 66 Objections to the Power of 
						the Senate To Set as a Court for Impeachments Further 
						Considered
 From the New York Packet. Tuesday, March 11, 1788.
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				| Author: Alexander Hamilton 
 To the People of the State of New York:
 
 A REVIEW of the principal objections that have appeared against 
				the proposed court for the trial of impeachments, will not 
				improbably eradicate the remains of any unfavorable impressions 
				which may still exist in regard to this matter.
 
 The FIRST of these objections is, that the provision in question 
				confounds legislative and judiciary authorities in the same 
				body, in violation of that important and well established maxim 
				which requires a separation between the different departments of 
				power. The true meaning of this maxim has been discussed and 
				ascertained in another place, and has been shown to be entirely 
				compatible with a partial intermixture of those departments for 
				special purposes, preserving them, in the main, distinct and 
				unconnected. This partial intermixture is even, in some cases, 
				not only proper but necessary to the mutual defense of the 
				several members of the government against each other. An 
				absolute or qualified negative in the executive upon the acts of 
				the legislative body, is admitted, by the ablest adepts in 
				political science, to be an indispensable barrier against the 
				encroachments of the latter upon the former. And it may, 
				perhaps, with no less reason be contended, that the powers 
				relating to impeachments are, as before intimated, an essential 
				check in the hands of that body upon the encroachments of the 
				executive. The division of them between the two branches of the 
				legislature, assigning to one the right of accusing, to the 
				other the right of judging, avoids the inconvenience of making 
				the same persons both accusers and judges; and guards against 
				the danger of persecution, from the prevalency of a factious 
				spirit in either of those branches. As the concurrence of two 
				thirds of the Senate will be requisite to a condemnation, the 
				security to innocence, from this additional circumstance, will 
				be as complete as itself can desire.
 
 It is curious to observe, with what vehemence this part of the 
				plan is assailed, on the principle here taken notice of, by men 
				who profess to admire, without exception, the constitution of 
				this State; while that constitution makes the Senate, together 
				with the chancellor and judges of the Supreme Court, not only a 
				court of impeachments, but the highest judicatory in the State, 
				in all causes, civil and criminal. The proportion, in point of 
				numbers, of the chancellor and judges to the senators, is so 
				inconsiderable, that the judiciary authority of New York, in the 
				last resort, may, with truth, be said to reside in its Senate. 
				If the plan of the convention be, in this respect, chargeable 
				with a departure from the celebrated maxim which has been so 
				often mentioned, and seems to be so little understood, how much 
				more culpable must be the constitution of New York?
 
 A SECOND objection to the Senate, as a court of impeachments, 
				is, that it contributes to an undue accumulation of power in 
				that body, tending to give to the government a countenance too 
				aristocratic. The Senate, it is observed, is to have concurrent 
				authority with the Executive in the formation of treaties and in 
				the appointment to offices: if, say the objectors, to these 
				prerogatives is added that of deciding in all cases of 
				impeachment, it will give a decided predominancy to senatorial 
				influence. To an objection so little precise in itself, it is 
				not easy to find a very precise answer. Where is the measure or 
				criterion to which we can appeal, for determining what will give 
				the Senate too much, too little, or barely the proper degree of 
				influence? Will it not be more safe, as well as more simple, to 
				dismiss such vague and uncertain calculations, to examine each 
				power by itself, and to decide, on general principles, where it 
				may be deposited with most advantage and least inconvenience?
 
 If we take this course, it will lead to a more intelligible, if 
				not to a more certain result. The disposition of the power of 
				making treaties, which has obtained in the plan of the 
				convention, will, then, if I mistake not, appear to be fully 
				justified by the considerations stated in a former number, and 
				by others which will occur under the next head of our inquiries. 
				The expediency of the junction of the Senate with the Executive, 
				in the power of appointing to offices, will, I trust, be placed 
				in a light not less satisfactory, in the disquisitions under the 
				same head. And I flatter myself the observations in my last 
				paper must have gone no inconsiderable way towards proving that 
				it was not easy, if practicable, to find a more fit receptacle 
				for the power of determining impeachments, than that which has 
				been chosen. If this be truly the case, the hypothetical dread 
				of the too great weight of the Senate ought to be discarded from 
				our reasonings.
 
 But this hypothesis, such as it is, has already been refuted in 
				the remarks applied to the duration in office prescribed for the 
				senators. It was by them shown, as well on the credit of 
				historical examples, as from the reason of the thing, that the 
				most POPULAR branch of every government, partaking of the 
				republican genius, by being generally the favorite of the 
				people, will be as generally a full match, if not an overmatch, 
				for every other member of the Government.
 
 But independent of this most active and operative principle, to 
				secure the equilibrium of the national House of Representatives, 
				the plan of the convention has provided in its favor several 
				important counterpoises to the additional authorities to be 
				conferred upon the Senate. The exclusive privilege of 
				originating money bills will belong to the House of 
				Representatives. The same house will possess the sole right of 
				instituting impeachments: is not this a complete counterbalance 
				to that of determining them? The same house will be the umpire 
				in all elections of the President, which do not unite the 
				suffrages of a majority of the whole number of electors; a case 
				which it cannot be doubted will sometimes, if not frequently, 
				happen. The constant possibility of the thing must be a fruitful 
				source of influence to that body. The more it is contemplated, 
				the more important will appear this ultimate though contingent 
				power, of deciding the competitions of the most illustrious 
				citizens of the Union, for the first office in it. It would not 
				perhaps be rash to predict, that as a mean of influence it will 
				be found to outweigh all the peculiar attributes of the Senate.
 
 A THIRD objection to the Senate as a court of impeachments, is 
				drawn from the agency they are to have in the appointments to 
				office. It is imagined that they would be too indulgent judges 
				of the conduct of men, in whose official creation they had 
				participated. The principle of this objection would condemn a 
				practice, which is to be seen in all the State governments, if 
				not in all the governments with which we are acquainted: I mean 
				that of rendering those who hold offices during pleasure, 
				dependent on the pleasure of those who appoint them. With equal 
				plausibility might it be alleged in this case, that the 
				favoritism of the latter would always be an asylum for the 
				misbehavior of the former. But that practice, in contradiction 
				to this principle, proceeds upon the presumption, that the 
				responsibility of those who appoint, for the fitness and 
				competency of the persons on whom they bestow their choice, and 
				the interest they will have in the respectable and prosperous 
				administration of affairs, will inspire a sufficient disposition 
				to dismiss from a share in it all such who, by their conduct, 
				shall have proved themselves unworthy of the confidence reposed 
				in them. Though facts may not always correspond with this 
				presumption, yet if it be, in the main, just, it must destroy 
				the supposition that the Senate, who will merely sanction the 
				choice of the Executive, should feel a bias, towards the objects 
				of that choice, strong enough to blind them to the evidences of 
				guilt so extraordinary, as to have induced the representatives 
				of the nation to become its accusers.
 
 If any further arguments were necessary to evince the 
				improbability of such a bias, it might be found in the nature of 
				the agency of the Senate in the business of appointments.
 
 It will be the office of the President to NOMINATE, and, with 
				the advice and consent of the Senate, to APPOINT. There will, of 
				course, be no exertion of CHOICE on the part of the Senate. They 
				may defeat one choice of the Executive, and oblige him to make 
				another; but they cannot themselves CHOOSE, they can only ratify 
				or reject the choice of the President. They might even entertain 
				a preference to some other person, at the very moment they were 
				assenting to the one proposed, because there might be no 
				positive ground of opposition to him; and they could not be 
				sure, if they withheld their assent, that the subsequent 
				nomination would fall upon their own favorite, or upon any other 
				person in their estimation more meritorious than the one 
				rejected. Thus it could hardly happen, that the majority of the 
				Senate would feel any other complacency towards the object of an 
				appointment than such as the appearances of merit might inspire, 
				and the proofs of the want of it destroy.
 
 A FOURTH objection to the Senate in the capacity of a court of 
				impeachments, is derived from its union with the Executive in 
				the power of making treaties. This, it has been said, would 
				constitute the senators their own judges, in every case of a 
				corrupt or perfidious execution of that trust. After having 
				combined with the Executive in betraying the interests of the 
				nation in a ruinous treaty, what prospect, it is asked, would 
				there be of their being made to suffer the punishment they would 
				deserve, when they were themselves to decide upon the accusation 
				brought against them for the treachery of which they have been 
				guilty?
 
 This objection has been circulated with more earnestness and 
				with greater show of reason than any other which has appeared 
				against this part of the plan; and yet I am deceived if it does 
				not rest upon an erroneous foundation.
 
 The security essentially intended by the Constitution against 
				corruption and treachery in the formation of treaties, is to be 
				sought for in the numbers and characters of those who are to 
				make them. The JOINT AGENCY of the Chief Magistrate of the 
				Union, and of two thirds of the members of a body selected by 
				the collective wisdom of the legislatures of the several States, 
				is designed to be the pledge for the fidelity of the national 
				councils in this particular. The convention might with propriety 
				have meditated the punishment of the Executive, for a deviation 
				from the instructions of the Senate, or a want of integrity in 
				the conduct of the negotiations committed to him; they might 
				also have had in view the punishment of a few leading 
				individuals in the Senate, who should have prostituted their 
				influence in that body as the mercenary instruments of foreign 
				corruption: but they could not, with more or with equal 
				propriety, have contemplated the impeachment and punishment of 
				two thirds of the Senate, consenting to an improper treaty, than 
				of a majority of that or of the other branch of the national 
				legislature, consenting to a pernicious or unconstitutional law, 
				a principle which, I believe, has never been admitted into any 
				government. How, in fact, could a majority in the House of 
				Representatives impeach themselves? Not better, it is evident, 
				than two thirds of the Senate might try themselves. And yet what 
				reason is there, that a majority of the House of 
				Representatives, sacrificing the interests of the society by an 
				unjust and tyrannical act of legislation, should escape with 
				impunity, more than two thirds of the Senate, sacrificing the 
				same interests in an injurious treaty with a foreign power? The 
				truth is, that in all such cases it is essential to the freedom 
				and to the necessary independence of the deliberations of the 
				body, that the members of it should be exempt from punishment 
				for acts done in a collective capacity; and the security to the 
				society must depend on the care which is taken to confide the 
				trust to proper hands, to make it their interest to execute it 
				with fidelity, and to make it as difficult as possible for them 
				to combine in any interest opposite to that of the public good.
 
 So far as might concern the misbehavior of the Executive in 
				perverting the instructions or contravening the views of the 
				Senate, we need not be apprehensive of the want of a disposition 
				in that body to punish the abuse of their confidence or to 
				vindicate their own authority. We may thus far count upon their 
				pride, if not upon their virtue. And so far even as might 
				concern the corruption of leading members, by whose arts and 
				influence the majority may have been inveigled into measures 
				odious to the community, if the proofs of that corruption should 
				be satisfactory, the usual propensity of human nature will 
				warrant us in concluding that there would be commonly no defect 
				of inclination in the body to divert the public resentment from 
				themselves by a ready sacrifice of the authors of their 
				mismanagement and disgrace.
 
 PUBLIUS
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