| Author: Alexander Hamilton 
 To the People of the State of New York:
 
 THE President is to have power, ``by and with the advice and 
				consent of the Senate, to make treaties, provided two thirds of 
				the senators present concur.''
 
 Though this provision has been assailed, on different grounds, 
				with no small degree of vehemence, I scruple not to declare my 
				firm persuasion, that it is one of the best digested and most 
				unexceptionable parts of the plan. One ground of objection is 
				the trite topic of the intermixture of powers; some contending 
				that the President ought alone to possess the power of making 
				treaties; others, that it ought to have been exclusively 
				deposited in the Senate. Another source of objection is derived 
				from the small number of persons by whom a treaty may be made. 
				Of those who espouse this objection, a part are of opinion that 
				the House of Representatives ought to have been associated in 
				the business, while another part seem to think that nothing more 
				was necessary than to have substituted two thirds of ALL the 
				members of the Senate, to two thirds of the members PRESENT. As 
				I flatter myself the observations made in a preceding number 
				upon this part of the plan must have sufficed to place it, to a 
				discerning eye, in a very favorable light, I shall here content 
				myself with offering only some supplementary remarks, 
				principally with a view to the objections which have been just 
				stated.
 
 With regard to the intermixture of powers, I shall rely upon the 
				explanations already given in other places, of the true sense of 
				the rule upon which that objection is founded; and shall take it 
				for granted, as an inference from them, that the union of the 
				Executive with the Senate, in the article of treaties, is no 
				infringement of that rule. I venture to add, that the particular 
				nature of the power of making treaties indicates a peculiar 
				propriety in that union. Though several writers on the subject 
				of government place that power in the class of executive 
				authorities, yet this is evidently an arbitrary disposition; for 
				if we attend carefully to its operation, it will be found to 
				partake more of the legislative than of the executive character, 
				though it does not seem strictly to fall within the definition 
				of either of them. The essence of the legislative authority is 
				to enact laws, or, in other words, to prescribe rules for the 
				regulation of the society; while the execution of the laws, and 
				the employment of the common strength, either for this purpose 
				or for the common defense, seem to comprise all the functions of 
				the executive magistrate. The power of making treaties is, 
				plainly, neither the one nor the other. It relates neither to 
				the execution of the subsisting laws, nor to the enaction of new 
				ones; and still less to an exertion of the common strength. Its 
				objects are CONTRACTS with foreign nations, which have the force 
				of law, but derive it from the obligations of good faith. They 
				are not rules prescribed by the sovereign to the subject, but 
				agreements between sovereign and sovereign. The power in 
				question seems therefore to form a distinct department, and to 
				belong, properly, neither to the legislative nor to the 
				executive. The qualities elsewhere detailed as indispensable in 
				the management of foreign negotiations, point out the Executive 
				as the most fit agent in those transactions; while the vast 
				importance of the trust, and the operation of treaties as laws, 
				plead strongly for the participation of the whole or a portion 
				of the legislative body in the office of making them.
 
 However proper or safe it may be in governments where the 
				executive magistrate is an hereditary monarch, to commit to him 
				the entire power of making treaties, it would be utterly unsafe 
				and improper to intrust that power to an elective magistrate of 
				four years' duration. It has been remarked, upon another 
				occasion, and the remark is unquestionably just, that an 
				hereditary monarch, though often the oppressor of his people, 
				has personally too much stake in the government to be in any 
				material danger of being corrupted by foreign powers. But a man 
				raised from the station of a private citizen to the rank of 
				chief magistrate, possessed of a moderate or slender fortune, 
				and looking forward to a period not very remote when he may 
				probably be obliged to return to the station from which he was 
				taken, might sometimes be under temptations to sacrifice his 
				duty to his interest, which it would require superlative virtue 
				to withstand. An avaricious man might be tempted to betray the 
				interests of the state to the acquisition of wealth. An 
				ambitious man might make his own aggrandizement, by the aid of a 
				foreign power, the price of his treachery to his constituents. 
				The history of human conduct does not warrant that exalted 
				opinion of human virtue which would make it wise in a nation to 
				commit interests of so delicate and momentous a kind, as those 
				which concern its intercourse with the rest of the world, to the 
				sole disposal of a magistrate created and circumstanced as would 
				be a President of the United States.
 
 To have intrusted the power of making treaties to the Senate 
				alone, would have been to relinquish the benefits of the 
				constitutional agency of the President in the conduct of foreign 
				negotiations. It is true that the Senate would, in that case, 
				have the option of employing him in this capacity, but they 
				would also have the option of letting it alone, and pique or 
				cabal might induce the latter rather than the former. Besides 
				this, the ministerial servant of the Senate could not be 
				expected to enjoy the confidence and respect of foreign powers 
				in the same degree with the constitutional representatives of 
				the nation, and, of course, would not be able to act with an 
				equal degree of weight or efficacy. While the Union would, from 
				this cause, lose a considerable advantage in the management of 
				its external concerns, the people would lose the additional 
				security which would result from the co-operation of the 
				Executive. Though it would be imprudent to confide in him solely 
				so important a trust, yet it cannot be doubted that his 
				participation would materially add to the safety of the society. 
				It must indeed be clear to a demonstration that the joint 
				possession of the power in question, by the President and 
				Senate, would afford a greater prospect of security, than the 
				separate possession of it by either of them. And whoever has 
				maturely weighed the circumstances which must concur in the 
				appointment of a President, will be satisfied that the office 
				will always bid fair to be filled by men of such characters as 
				to render their concurrence in the formation of treaties 
				peculiarly desirable, as well on the score of wisdom, as on that 
				of integrity.
 
 The remarks made in a former number, which have been alluded to 
				in another part of this paper, will apply with conclusive force 
				against the admission of the House of Representatives to a share 
				in the formation of treaties. The fluctuating and, taking its 
				future increase into the account, the multitudinous composition 
				of that body, forbid us to expect in it those qualities which 
				are essential to the proper execution of such a trust. Accurate 
				and comprehensive knowledge of foreign politics; a steady and 
				systematic adherence to the same views; a nice and uniform 
				sensibility to national character; decision, SECRECY, and 
				despatch, are incompatible with the genius of a body so variable 
				and so numerous. The very complication of the business, by 
				introducing a necessity of the concurrence of so many different 
				bodies, would of itself afford a solid objection. The greater 
				frequency of the calls upon the House of Representatives, and 
				the greater length of time which it would often be necessary to 
				keep them together when convened, to obtain their sanction in 
				the progressive stages of a treaty, would be a source of so 
				great inconvenience and expense as alone ought to condemn the 
				project.
 
 The only objection which remains to be canvassed, is that which 
				would substitute the proportion of two thirds of all the members 
				composing the senatorial body, to that of two thirds of the 
				members PRESENT. It has been shown, under the second head of our 
				inquiries, that all provisions which require more than the 
				majority of any body to its resolutions, have a direct tendency 
				to embarrass the operations of the government, and an indirect 
				one to subject the sense of the majority to that of the 
				minority. This consideration seems sufficient to determine our 
				opinion, that the convention have gone as far in the endeavor to 
				secure the advantage of numbers in the formation of treaties as 
				could have been reconciled either with the activity of the 
				public councils or with a reasonable regard to the major sense 
				of the community. If two thirds of the whole number of members 
				had been required, it would, in many cases, from the 
				non-attendance of a part, amount in practice to a necessity of 
				unanimity. And the history of every political establishment in 
				which this principle has prevailed, is a history of impotence, 
				perplexity, and disorder. Proofs of this position might be 
				adduced from the examples of the Roman Tribuneship, the Polish 
				Diet, and the States-General of the Netherlands, did not an 
				example at home render foreign precedents unnecessary.
 
 To require a fixed proportion of the whole body would not, in 
				all probability, contribute to the advantages of a numerous 
				agency, better then merely to require a proportion of the 
				attending members. The former, by making a determinate number at 
				all times requisite to a resolution, diminishes the motives to 
				punctual attendance. The latter, by making the capacity of the 
				body to depend on a PROPORTION which may be varied by the 
				absence or presence of a single member, has the contrary effect. 
				And as, by promoting punctuality, it tends to keep the body 
				complete, there is great likelihood that its resolutions would 
				generally be dictated by as great a number in this case as in 
				the other; while there would be much fewer occasions of delay. 
				It ought not to be forgotten that, under the existing 
				Confederation, two members MAY, and usually DO, represent a 
				State; whence it happens that Congress, who now are solely 
				invested with ALL THE POWERS of the Union, rarely consist of a 
				greater number of persons than would compose the intended 
				Senate. If we add to this, that as the members vote by States, 
				and that where there is only a single member present from a 
				State, his vote is lost, it will justify a supposition that the 
				active voices in the Senate, where the members are to vote 
				individually, would rarely fall short in number of the active 
				voices in the existing Congress. When, in addition to these 
				considerations, we take into view the co-operation of the 
				President, we shall not hesitate to infer that the people of 
				America would have greater security against an improper use of 
				the power of making treaties, under the new Constitution, than 
				they now enjoy under the Confederation. And when we proceed 
				still one step further, and look forward to the probable 
				augmentation of the Senate, by the erection of new States, we 
				shall not only perceive ample ground of confidence in the 
				sufficiency of the members to whose agency that power will be 
				intrusted, but we shall probably be led to conclude that a body 
				more numerous than the Senate would be likely to become, would 
				be very little fit for the proper discharge of the trust.
 
 PUBLIUS.
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