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						No. 77 The Appointing Power 
						Continued and Other Powers of the Executive Considered - 
						From the New York Packet. Friday, April 4, 1788.
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				| Author: Alexander Hamilton 
 To the People of the State of New York:
 
 IT HAS been mentioned as one of the advantages to be expected 
				from the co-operation of the Senate, in the business of 
				appointments, that it would contribute to the stability of the 
				administration. The consent of that body would be necessary to 
				displace as well as to appoint. A change of the Chief 
				Magistrate, therefore, would not occasion so violent or so 
				general a revolution in the officers of the government as might 
				be expected, if he were the sole disposer of offices. Where a 
				man in any station had given satisfactory evidence of his 
				fitness for it, a new President would be restrained from 
				attempting a change in favor of a person more agreeable to him, 
				by the apprehension that a discountenance of the Senate might 
				frustrate the attempt, and bring some degree of discredit upon 
				himself. Those who can best estimate the value of a steady 
				administration, will be most disposed to prize a provision which 
				connects the official existence of public men with the 
				approbation or disapprobation of that body which, from the 
				greater permanency of its own composition, will in all 
				probability be less subject to inconstancy than any other member 
				of the government.
 
 To this union of the Senate with the President, in the article 
				of appointments, it has in some cases been suggested that it 
				would serve to give the President an undue influence over the 
				Senate, and in others that it would have an opposite tendency, a 
				strong proof that neither suggestion is true.
 
 To state the first in its proper form, is to refute it. It 
				amounts to this: the President would have an improper INFLUENCE 
				OVER the Senate, because the Senate would have the power of 
				RESTRAINING him. This is an absurdity in terms. It cannot admit 
				of a doubt that the entire power of appointment would enable him 
				much more effectually to establish a dangerous empire over that 
				body, than a mere power of nomination subject to their control.
 
 Let us take a view of the converse of the proposition: ``the 
				Senate would influence the Executive.'' As I have had occasion 
				to remark in several other instances, the indistinctness of the 
				objection forbids a precise answer. In what manner is this 
				influence to be exerted? In relation to what objects? The power 
				of influencing a person, in the sense in which it is here used, 
				must imply a power of conferring a benefit upon him. How could 
				the Senate confer a benefit upon the President by the manner of 
				employing their right of negative upon his nominations? If it be 
				said they might sometimes gratify him by an acquiescence in a 
				favorite choice, when public motives might dictate a different 
				conduct, I answer, that the instances in which the President 
				could be personally interested in the result, would be too few 
				to admit of his being materially affected by the compliances of 
				the Senate. The POWER which can ORIGINATE the disposition of 
				honors and emoluments, is more likely to attract than to be 
				attracted by the POWER which can merely obstruct their course. 
				If by influencing the President be meant RESTRAINING him, this 
				is precisely what must have been intended. And it has been shown 
				that the restraint would be salutary, at the same time that it 
				would not be such as to destroy a single advantage to be looked 
				for from the uncontrolled agency of that Magistrate. The right 
				of nomination would produce all the good of that of appointment, 
				and would in a great measure avoid its evils. Upon a comparison 
				of the plan for the appointment of the officers of the proposed 
				government with that which is established by the constitution of 
				this State, a decided preference must be given to the former. In 
				that plan the power of nomination is unequivocally vested in the 
				Executive. And as there would be a necessity for submitting each 
				nomination to the judgment of an entire branch of the 
				legislature, the circumstances attending an appointment, from 
				the mode of conducting it, would naturally become matters of 
				notoriety; and the public would be at no loss to determine what 
				part had been performed by the different actors. The blame of a 
				bad nomination would fall upon the President singly and 
				absolutely. The censure of rejecting a good one would lie 
				entirely at the door of the Senate; aggravated by the 
				consideration of their having counteracted the good intentions 
				of the Executive. If an ill appointment should be made, the 
				Executive for nominating, and the Senate for approving, would 
				participate, though in different degrees, in the opprobrium and 
				disgrace.
 
 The reverse of all this characterizes the manner of appointment 
				in this State. The council of appointment consists of from three 
				to five persons, of whom the governor is always one. This small 
				body, shut up in a private apartment, impenetrable to the public 
				eye, proceed to the execution of the trust committed to them. It 
				is known that the governor claims the right of nomination, upon 
				the strength of some ambiguous expressions in the constitution; 
				but it is not known to what extent, or in what manner he 
				exercises it; nor upon what occasions he is contradicted or 
				opposed. The censure of a bad appointment, on account of the 
				uncertainty of its author, and for want of a determinate object, 
				has neither poignancy nor duration. And while an unbounded field 
				for cabal and intrigue lies open, all idea of responsibility is 
				lost. The most that the public can know, is that the governor 
				claims the right of nomination; that TWO out of the 
				inconsiderable number of FOUR men can too often be managed 
				without much difficulty; that if some of the members of a 
				particular council should happen to be of an uncomplying 
				character, it is frequently not impossible to get rid of their 
				opposition by regulating the times of meeting in such a manner 
				as to render their attendance inconvenient; and that from 
				whatever cause it may proceed, a great number of very improper 
				appointments are from time to time made. Whether a governor of 
				this State avails himself of the ascendant he must necessarily 
				have, in this delicate and important part of the administration, 
				to prefer to offices men who are best qualified for them, or 
				whether he prostitutes that advantage to the advancement of 
				persons whose chief merit is their implicit devotion to his 
				will, and to the support of a despicable and dangerous system of 
				personal influence, are questions which, unfortunately for the 
				community, can only be the subjects of speculation and 
				conjecture.
 
 Every mere council of appointment, however constituted, will be 
				a conclave, in which cabal and intrigue will have their full 
				scope. Their number, without an unwarrantable increase of 
				expense, cannot be large enough to preclude a facility of 
				combination. And as each member will have his friends and 
				connections to provide for, the desire of mutual gratification 
				will beget a scandalous bartering of votes and bargaining for 
				places. The private attachments of one man might easily be 
				satisfied; but to satisfy the private attachments of a dozen, or 
				of twenty men, would occasion a monopoly of all the principal 
				employments of the government in a few families, and would lead 
				more directly to an aristocracy or an oligarchy than any measure 
				that could be contrived. If, to avoid an accumulation of 
				offices, there was to be a frequent change in the persons who 
				were to compose the council, this would involve the mischiefs of 
				a mutable administration in their full extent. Such a council 
				would also be more liable to executive influence than the 
				Senate, because they would be fewer in number, and would act 
				less immediately under the public inspection. Such a council, in 
				fine, as a substitute for the plan of the convention, would be 
				productive of an increase of expense, a multiplication of the 
				evils which spring from favoritism and intrigue in the 
				distribution of public honors, a decrease of stability in the 
				administration of the government, and a diminution of the 
				security against an undue influence of the Executive. And yet 
				such a council has been warmly contended for as an essential 
				amendment in the proposed Constitution.
 
 I could not with propriety conclude my observations on the 
				subject of appointments without taking notice of a scheme for 
				which there have appeared some, though but few advocates; I mean 
				that of uniting the House of Representatives in the power of 
				making them. I shall, however, do little more than mention it, 
				as I cannot imagine that it is likely to gain the countenance of 
				any considerable part of the community. A body so fluctuating 
				and at the same time so numerous, can never be deemed proper for 
				the exercise of that power. Its unfitness will appear manifest 
				to all, when it is recollected that in half a century it may 
				consist of three or four hundred persons. All the advantages of 
				the stability, both of the Executive and of the Senate, would be 
				defeated by this union, and infinite delays and embarrassments 
				would be occasioned. The example of most of the States in their 
				local constitutions encourages us to reprobate the idea.
 
 The only remaining powers of the Executive are comprehended in 
				giving information to Congress of the state of the Union; in 
				recommending to their consideration such measures as he shall 
				judge expedient; in convening them, or either branch, upon 
				extraordinary occasions; in adjourning them when they cannot 
				themselves agree upon the time of adjournment; in receiving 
				ambassadors and other public ministers; in faithfully executing 
				the laws; and in commissioning all the officers of the United 
				States.
 
 Except some cavils about the power of convening EITHER house of 
				the legislature, and that of receiving ambassadors, no objection 
				has been made to this class of authorities; nor could they 
				possibly admit of any. It required, indeed, an insatiable 
				avidity for censure to invent exceptions to the parts which have 
				been excepted to. In regard to the power of convening either 
				house of the legislature, I shall barely remark, that in respect 
				to the Senate at least, we can readily discover a good reason 
				for it. AS this body has a concurrent power with the Executive 
				in the article of treaties, it might often be necessary to call 
				it together with a view to this object, when it would be 
				unnecessary and improper to convene the House of 
				Representatives. As to the reception of ambassadors, what I have 
				said in a former paper will furnish a sufficient answer.
 
 We have now completed a survey of the structure and powers of 
				the executive department, which, I have endeavored to show, 
				combines, as far as republican principles will admit, all the 
				requisites to energy. The remaining inquiry is: Does it also 
				combine the requisites to safety, in a republican sense, a due 
				dependence on the people, a due responsibility? The answer to 
				this question has been anticipated in the investigation of its 
				other characteristics, and is satisfactorily deducible from 
				these circumstances; from the election of the President once in 
				four years by persons immediately chosen by the people for that 
				purpose; and from his being at all times liable to impeachment, 
				trial, dismission from office, incapacity to serve in any other, 
				and to forfeiture of life and estate by subsequent prosecution 
				in the common course of law. But these precautions, great as 
				they are, are not the only ones which the plan of the convention 
				has provided in favor of the public security. In the only 
				instances in which the abuse of the executive authority was 
				materially to be feared, the Chief Magistrate of the United 
				States would, by that plan, be subjected to the control of a 
				branch of the legislative body. What more could be desired by an 
				enlightened and reasonable people?
 
 PUBLIUS.
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