| Author: Alexander Hamilton 
 To the People of the State of New York:
 
 THE importance of the Union, in a commercial light, is one of 
				those points about which there is least room to entertain a 
				difference of opinion, and which has, in fact, commanded the 
				most general assent of men who have any acquaintance with the 
				subject. This applies as well to our intercourse with foreign 
				countries as with each other.
 
 There are appearances to authorize a supposition that the 
				adventurous spirit, which distinguishes the commercial character 
				of America, has already excited uneasy sensations in several of 
				the maritime powers of Europe. They seem to be apprehensive of 
				our too great interference in that carrying trade, which is the 
				support of their navigation and the foundation of their naval 
				strength. Those of them which have colonies in America look 
				forward to what this country is capable of becoming, with 
				painful solicitude. They foresee the dangers that may threaten 
				their American dominions from the neighborhood of States, which 
				have all the dispositions, and would possess all the means, 
				requisite to the creation of a powerful marine. Impressions of 
				this kind will naturally indicate the policy of fostering 
				divisions among us, and of depriving us, as far as possible, of 
				an ACTIVE COMMERCE in our own bottoms. This would answer the 
				threefold purpose of preventing our interference in their 
				navigation, of monopolizing the profits of our trade, and of 
				clipping the wings by which we might soar to a dangerous 
				greatness. Did not prudence forbid the detail, it would not be 
				difficult to trace, by facts, the workings of this policy to the 
				cabinets of ministers.
 
 If we continue united, we may counteract a policy so unfriendly 
				to our prosperity in a variety of ways. By prohibitory 
				regulations, extending, at the same time, throughout the States, 
				we may oblige foreign countries to bid against each other, for 
				the privileges of our markets. This assertion will not appear 
				chimerical to those who are able to appreciate the importance of 
				the markets of three millions of people--increasing in rapid 
				progression, for the most part exclusively addicted to 
				agriculture, and likely from local circumstances to remain 
				so--to any manufacturing nation; and the immense difference 
				there would be to the trade and navigation of such a nation, 
				between a direct communication in its own ships, and an indirect 
				conveyance of its products and returns, to and from America, in 
				the ships of another country. Suppose, for instance, we had a 
				government in America, capable of excluding Great Britain (with 
				whom we have at present no treaty of commerce) from all our 
				ports; what would be the probable operation of this step upon 
				her politics? Would it not enable us to negotiate, with the 
				fairest prospect of success, for commercial privileges of the 
				most valuable and extensive kind, in the dominions of that 
				kingdom? When these questions have been asked, upon other 
				occasions, they have received a plausible, but not a solid or 
				satisfactory answer. It has been said that prohibitions on our 
				part would produce no change in the system of Britain, because 
				she could prosecute her trade with us through the medium of the 
				Dutch, who would be her immediate customers and paymasters for 
				those articles which were wanted for the supply of our markets. 
				But would not her navigation be materially injured by the loss 
				of the important advantage of being her own carrier in that 
				trade? Would not the principal part of its profits be 
				intercepted by the Dutch, as a compensation for their agency and 
				risk? Would not the mere circumstance of freight occasion a 
				considerable deduction? Would not so circuitous an intercourse 
				facilitate the competitions of other nations, by enhancing the 
				price of British commodities in our markets, and by transferring 
				to other hands the management of this interesting branch of the 
				British commerce?
 
 A mature consideration of the objects suggested by these 
				questions will justify a belief that the real disadvantages to 
				Britain from such a state of things, conspiring with the 
				pre-possessions of a great part of the nation in favor of the 
				American trade, and with the importunities of the West India 
				islands, would produce a relaxation in her present system, and 
				would let us into the enjoyment of privileges in the markets of 
				those islands elsewhere, from which our trade would derive the 
				most substantial benefits. Such a point gained from the British 
				government, and which could not be expected without an 
				equivalent in exemptions and immunities in our markets, would be 
				likely to have a correspondent effect on the conduct of other 
				nations, who would not be inclined to see themselves altogether 
				supplanted in our trade.
 
 A further resource for influencing the conduct of European 
				nations toward us, in this respect, would arise from the 
				establishment of a federal navy. There can be no doubt that the 
				continuance of the Union under an efficient government would put 
				it in our power, at a period not very distant, to create a navy 
				which, if it could not vie with those of the great maritime 
				powers, would at least be of respectable weight if thrown into 
				the scale of either of two contending parties. This would be 
				more peculiarly the case in relation to operations in the West 
				Indies. A few ships of the line, sent opportunely to the 
				reinforcement of either side, would often be sufficient to 
				decide the fate of a campaign, on the event of which interests 
				of the greatest magnitude were suspended. Our position is, in 
				this respect, a most commanding one. And if to this 
				consideration we add that of the usefulness of supplies from 
				this country, in the prosecution of military operations in the 
				West Indies, it will readily be perceived that a situation so 
				favorable would enable us to bargain with great advantage for 
				commercial privileges. A price would be set not only upon our 
				friendship, but upon our neutrality. By a steady adherence to 
				the Union we may hope, erelong, to become the arbiter of Europe 
				in America, and to be able to incline the balance of European 
				competitions in this part of the world as our interest may 
				dictate.
 
 But in the reverse of this eligible situation, we shall discover 
				that the rivalships of the parts would make them checks upon 
				each other, and would frustrate all the tempting advantages 
				which nature has kindly placed within our reach. In a state so 
				insignificant our commerce would be a prey to the wanton 
				intermeddlings of all nations at war with each other; who, 
				having nothing to fear from us, would with little scruple or 
				remorse, supply their wants by depredations on our property as 
				often as it fell in their way. The rights of neutrality will 
				only be respected when they are defended by an adequate power. A 
				nation, despicable by its weakness, forfeits even the privilege 
				of being neutral.
 
 Under a vigorous national government, the natural strength and 
				resources of the country, directed to a common interest, would 
				baffle all the combinations of European jealousy to restrain our 
				growth. This situation would even take away the motive to such 
				combinations, by inducing an impracticability of success. An 
				active commerce, an extensive navigation, and a flourishing 
				marine would then be the offspring of moral and physical 
				necessity. We might defy the little arts of the little 
				politicians to control or vary the irresistible and unchangeable 
				course of nature.
 
 But in a state of disunion, these combinations might exist and 
				might operate with success. It would be in the power of the 
				maritime nations, availing themselves of our universal 
				impotence, to prescribe the conditions of our political 
				existence; and as they have a common interest in being our 
				carriers, and still more in preventing our becoming theirs, they 
				would in all probability combine to embarrass our navigation in 
				such a manner as would in effect destroy it, and confine us to a 
				PASSIVE COMMERCE. We should then be compelled to content 
				ourselves with the first price of our commodities, and to see 
				the profits of our trade snatched from us to enrich our enemies 
				and p rsecutors. That unequaled spirit of enterprise, which 
				signalizes the genius of the American merchants and navigators, 
				and which is in itself an inexhaustible mine of national wealth, 
				would be stifled and lost, and poverty and disgrace would 
				overspread a country which, with wisdom, might make herself the 
				admiration and envy of the world.
 
 There are rights of great moment to the trade of America which 
				are rights of the Union--I allude to the fisheries, to the 
				navigation of the Western lakes, and to that of the Mississippi. 
				The dissolution of the Confederacy would give room for delicate 
				questions concerning the future existence of these rights; which 
				the interest of more powerful partners would hardly fail to 
				solve to our disadvantage. The disposition of Spain with regard 
				to the Mississippi needs no comment. France and Britain are 
				concerned with us in the fisheries, and view them as of the 
				utmost moment to their navigation. They, of course, would hardly 
				remain long indifferent to that decided mastery, of which 
				experience has shown us to be possessed in this valuable branch 
				of traffic, and by which we are able to undersell those nations 
				in their own markets. What more natural than that they should be 
				disposed to exclude from the lists such dangerous competitors?
 
 This branch of trade ought not to be considered as a partial 
				benefit. All the navigating States may, in different degrees, 
				advantageously participate in it, and under circumstances of a 
				greater extension of mercantile capital, would not be unlikely 
				to do it. As a nursery of seamen, it now is, or when time shall 
				have more nearly assimilated the principles of navigation in the 
				several States, will become, a universal resource. To the 
				establishment of a navy, it must be indispensable.
 
 To this great national object, a NAVY, union will contribute in 
				various ways. Every institution will grow and flourish in 
				proportion to the quantity and extent of the means concentred 
				towards its formation and support. A navy of the United States, 
				as it would embrace the resources of all, is an object far less 
				remote than a navy of any single State or partial confederacy, 
				which would only embrace the resources of a single part. It 
				happens, indeed, that different portions of confederated America 
				possess each some peculiar advantage for this essential 
				establishment. The more southern States furnish in greater 
				abundance certain kinds of naval stores--tar, pitch, and 
				turpentine. Their wood for the construction of ships is also of 
				a more solid and lasting texture. The difference in the duration 
				of the ships of which the navy might be composed, if chiefly 
				constructed of Southern wood, would be of signal importance, 
				either in the view of naval strength or of national economy. 
				Some of the Southern and of the Middle States yield a greater 
				plenty of iron, and of better quality. Seamen must chiefly be 
				drawn from the Northern hive. The necessity of naval protection 
				to external or maritime commerce does not require a particular 
				elucidation, no more than the conduciveness of that species of 
				commerce to the prosperity of a navy.
 
 An unrestrained intercourse between the States themselves will 
				advance the trade of each by an interchange of their respective 
				productions, not only for the supply of reciprocal wants at 
				home, but for exportation to foreign markets. The veins of 
				commerce in every part will be replenished, and will acquire 
				additional motion and vigor from a free circulation of the 
				commodities of every part. Commercial enterprise will have much 
				greater scope, from the diversity in the productions of 
				different States. When the staple of one fails from a bad 
				harvest or unproductive crop, it can call to its aid the staple 
				of another. The variety, not less than the value, of products 
				for exportation contributes to the activity of foreign commerce. 
				It can be conducted upon much better terms with a large number 
				of materials of a given value than with a small number of 
				materials of the same value; arising from the competitions of 
				trade and from the fluctations of markets. Particular articles 
				may be in great demand at certain periods, and unsalable at 
				others; but if there be a variety of articles, it can scarcely 
				happen that they should all be at one time in the latter 
				predicament, and on this account the operations of the merchant 
				would be less liable to any considerable obstruction or 
				stagnation. The speculative trader will at once perceive the 
				force of these observations, and will acknowledge that the 
				aggregate balance of the commerce of the United States would bid 
				fair to be much more favorable than that of the thirteen States 
				without union or with partial unions.
 
 It may perhaps be replied to this, that whether the States are 
				united or disunited, there would still be an intimate 
				intercourse between them which would answer the same ends; this 
				intercourse would be fettered, interrupted, and narrowed by a 
				multiplicity of causes, which in the course of these papers have 
				been amply detailed. A unity of commercial, as well as 
				political, interests, can only result from a unity of 
				government.
 
 There are other points of view in which this subject might be 
				placed, of a striking and animating kind. But they would lead us 
				too far into the regions of futurity, and would involve topics 
				not proper for a newspaper discussion. I shall briefly observe, 
				that our situation invites and our interests prompt us to aim at 
				an ascendant in the system of American affairs. The world may 
				politically, as well as geographically, be divided into four 
				parts, each having a distinct set of interests. Unhappily for 
				the other three, Europe, by her arms and by her negotiations, by 
				force and by fraud, has, in different degrees, extended her 
				dominion over them all. Africa, Asia, and America, have 
				successively felt her domination. The superiority she has long 
				maintained has tempted her to plume herself as the Mistress of 
				the World, and to consider the rest of mankind as created for 
				her benefit. Men admired as profound philosophers have, in 
				direct terms, attributed to her inhabitants a physical 
				superiority, and have gravely asserted that all animals, and 
				with them the human species, degenerate in America--that even 
				dogs cease to bark after having breathed awhile in our 
				atmosphere.Facts have too long supported these arrogant 
				pretensions of the Europeans. It belongs to us to vindicate the 
				honor of the human race, and to teach that assuming brother, 
				moderation. Union will enable us to do it. Disunion will will 
				add another victim to his triumphs. Let Americans disdain to be 
				the instruments of European greatness! Let the thirteen States, 
				bound together in a strict and indissoluble Union, concur in 
				erecting one great American system, superior to the control of 
				all transatlantic force or influence, and able to dictate the 
				terms of the connection between the old and the new world!
 
 PUBLIUS.
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