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						| Back | Federalist 
						No. 12 The Utility of the Union In 
						Respect to Revenue
 From the New York Packet. Tuesday, November 27, 1787.
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				| Author: Alexander Hamilton 
 To the People of the State of New York:
 
 THE effects of Union upon the commercial prosperity of the 
				States have been sufficiently delineated. Its tendency to 
				promote the interests of revenue will be the subject of our 
				present inquiry.
 
 The prosperity of commerce is now perceived and acknowledged by 
				all enlightened statesmen to be the most useful as well as the 
				most productive source of national wealth, and has accordingly 
				become a primary object of their political cares. By multipying 
				the means of gratification, by promoting the introduction and 
				circulation of the precious metals, those darling objects of 
				human avarice and enterprise, it serves to vivify and invigorate 
				the channels of industry, and to make them flow with greater 
				activity and copiousness. The assiduous merchant, the laborious 
				husbandman, the active mechanic, and the industrious 
				manufacturer,--all orders of men, look forward with eager 
				expectation and growing alacrity to this pleasing reward of 
				their toils. The often-agitated question between agriculture and 
				commerce has, from indubitable experience, received a decision 
				which has silenced the rivalship that once subsisted between 
				them, and has proved, to the satisfaction of their friends, that 
				their interests are intimately blended and interwoven. It has 
				been found in various countries that, in proportion as commerce 
				has flourished, land has risen in value. And how could it have 
				happened otherwise? Could that which procures a freer vent for 
				the products of the earth, which furnishes new incitements to 
				the cultivation of land, which is the most powerful instrument 
				in increasing the quantity of money in a state--could that, in 
				fine, which is the faithful handmaid of labor and industry, in 
				every shape, fail to augment that article, which is the prolific 
				parent of far the greatest part of the objects upon which they 
				are exerted? It is astonishing that so simple a truth should 
				ever have had an adversary; and it is one, among a multitude of 
				proofs, how apt a spirit of ill-informed jealousy, or of too 
				great abstraction and refinement, is to lead men astray from the 
				plainest truths of reason and conviction.
 
 The ability of a country to pay taxes must always be 
				proportioned, in a great degree, to the quantity of money in 
				circulation, and to the celerity with which it circulates. 
				Commerce, contributing to both these objects, must of necessity 
				render the payment of taxes easier, and facilitate the requisite 
				supplies to the treasury. The hereditary dominions of the 
				Emperor of Germany contain a great extent of fertile, 
				cultivated, and populous territory, a large proportion of which 
				is situated in mild and luxuriant climates. In some parts of 
				this territory are to be found the best gold and silver mines in 
				Europe. And yet, from the want of the fostering influence of 
				commerce, that monarch can boast but slender revenues. He has 
				several times been compelled to owe obligations to the pecuniary 
				succors of other nations for the preservation of his essential 
				interests, and is unable, upon the strength of his own 
				resources, to sustain a long or continued war.
 
 But it is not in this aspect of the subject alone that Union 
				will be seen to conduce to the purpose of revenue. There are 
				other points of view, in which its influence will appear more 
				immediate and decisive. It is evident from the state of the 
				country, from the habits of the people, from the experience we 
				have had on the point itself, that it is impracticable to raise 
				any very considerable sums by direct taxation. Tax laws have in 
				vain been multiplied; new methods to enforce the collection have 
				in vain been tried; the public expectation has been uniformly 
				disappointed, and the treasuries of the States have remained 
				empty. The popular system of administration inherent in the 
				nature of popular government, coinciding with the real scarcity 
				of money incident to a languid and mutilated state of trade, has 
				hitherto defeated every experiment for extensive collections, 
				and has at length taught the different legislatures the folly of 
				attempting them.
 
 No person acquainted with what happens in other countries will 
				be surprised at this circumstance. In so opulent a nation as 
				that of Britain, where direct taxes from superior wealth must be 
				much more tolerable, and, from the vigor of the government, much 
				more practicable, than in America, far the greatest part of the 
				national revenue is derived from taxes of the indirect kind, 
				from imposts, and from excises. Duties on imported articles form 
				a large branch of this latter description.
 
 In America, it is evident that we must a long time depend for 
				the means of revenue chiefly on such duties. In most parts of 
				it, excises must be confined within a narrow compass. The genius 
				of the people will ill brook the inquisitive and peremptory 
				spirit of excise laws. The pockets of the farmers, on the other 
				hand, will reluctantly yield but scanty supplies, in the 
				unwelcome shape of impositions on their houses and lands; and 
				personal property is too precarious and invisible a fund to be 
				laid hold of in any other way than by the inperceptible agency 
				of taxes on consumption.
 
 If these remarks have any foundation, that state of things which 
				will best enable us to improve and extend so valuable a resource 
				must be best adapted to our political welfare. And it cannot 
				admit of a serious doubt, that this state of things must rest on 
				the basis of a general Union. As far as this would be conducive 
				to the interests of commerce, so far it must tend to the 
				extension of the revenue to be drawn from that source. As far as 
				it would contribute to rendering regulations for the collection 
				of the duties more simple and efficacious, so far it must serve 
				to answer the purposes of making the same rate of duties more 
				productive, and of putting it into the power of the government 
				to increase the rate without prejudice to trade.
 
 The relative situation of these States; the number of rivers 
				with which they are intersected, and of bays that wash there 
				shores; the facility of communication in every direction; the 
				affinity of language and manners; the familiar habits of 
				intercourse; --all these are circumstances that would conspire 
				to render an illicit trade between them a matter of little 
				difficulty, and would insure frequent evasions of the commercial 
				regulations of each other. The separate States or confederacies 
				would be necessitated by mutual jealousy to avoid the 
				temptations to that kind of trade by the lowness of their 
				duties. The temper of our governments, for a long time to come, 
				would not permit those rigorous precautions by which the 
				European nations guard the avenues into their respective 
				countries, as well by land as by water; and which, even there, 
				are found insufficient obstacles to the adventurous stratagems 
				of avarice.
 
 In France, there is an army of patrols (as they are called) 
				constantly employed to secure their fiscal regulations against 
				the inroads of the dealers in contraband trade. Mr. Neckar 
				computes the number of these patrols at upwards of twenty 
				thousand. This shows the immense difficulty in preventing that 
				species of traffic, where there is an inland communication, and 
				places in a strong light the disadvantages with which the 
				collection of duties in this country would be encumbered, if by 
				disunion the States should be placed in a situation, with 
				respect to each other, resembling that of France with respect to 
				her neighbors. The arbitrary and vexatious powers with which the 
				patrols are necessarily armed, would be intolerable in a free 
				country.
 
 If, on the contrary, there be but one government pervading all 
				the States, there will be, as to the principal part of our 
				commerce, but ONE SIDE to guard--the ATLANTIC COAST. Vessels 
				arriving directly from foreign countries, laden with valuable 
				cargoes, would rarely choose to hazard themselves to the 
				complicated and critical perils which would attend attempts to 
				unlade prior to their coming into port. They would have to dread 
				both the dangers of the coast, and of detection, as well after 
				as before their arrival at the places of their final 
				destination. An ordinary degree of vigilance would be competent 
				to the prevention of any material infractions upon the rights of 
				the revenue. A few armed vessels, judiciously stationed at the 
				entrances of our ports, might at a small expense be made useful 
				sentinels of the laws. And the government having the same 
				interest to provide against violations everywhere, the 
				co-operation of its measures in each State would have a powerful 
				tendency to render them effectual. Here also we should preserve 
				by Union, an advantage which nature holds out to us, and which 
				would be relinquished by separation. The United States lie at a 
				great distance from Europe, and at a considerable distance from 
				all other places with which they would have extensive 
				connections of foreign trade. The passage from them to us, in a 
				few hours, or in a single night, as between the coasts of France 
				and Britain, and of other neighboring nations, would be 
				impracticable. This is a prodigious security against a direct 
				contraband with foreign countries; but a circuitous contraband 
				to one State, through the medium of another, would be both easy 
				and safe. The difference between a direct importation from 
				abroad, and an indirect importation through the channel of a 
				neighboring State, in small parcels, according to time and 
				opportunity, with the additional facilities of inland 
				communication, must be palpable to every man of discernment.
 
 It is therefore evident, that one national government would be 
				able, at much less expense, to extend the duties on imports, 
				beyond comparison, further than would be practicable to the 
				States separately, or to any partial confederacies. Hitherto, I 
				believe, it may safely be asserted, that these duties have not 
				upon an average exceeded in any State three per cent. In France 
				they are estimated to be about fifteen per cent., and in Britain 
				they exceed this proportion. There seems to be nothing to hinder 
				their being increased in this country to at least treble their 
				present amount. The single article of ardent spirits, under 
				federal regulation, might be made to furnish a considerable 
				revenue. Upon a ratio to the importation into this State, the 
				whole quantity imported into the United States may be estimated 
				at four millions of gallons; which, at a shilling per gallon, 
				would produce two hundred thousand pounds. That article would 
				well bear this rate of duty; and if it should tend to diminish 
				the consumption of it, such an effect would be equally favorable 
				to the agriculture, to the economy, to the morals, and to the 
				health of the society. There is, perhaps, nothing so much a 
				subject of national extravagance as these spirits.
 
 What will be the consequence, if we are not able to avail 
				ourselves of the resource in question in its full extent? A 
				nation cannot long exist without revenues. Destitute of this 
				essential support, it must resign its independence, and sink 
				into the degraded condition of a province. This is an extremity 
				to which no government will of choice accede. Revenue, 
				therefore, must be had at all events. In this country, if the 
				principal part be not drawn from commerce, it must fall with 
				oppressive weight upon land. It has been already intimated that 
				excises, in their true signification, are too little in unison 
				with the feelings of the people, to admit of great use being 
				made of that mode of taxation; nor, indeed, in the States where 
				almost the sole employment is agriculture, are the objects 
				proper for excise sufficiently numerous to permit very ample 
				collections in that way. Personal estate (as has been before 
				remarked), from the difficulty in tracing it, cannot be 
				subjected to large contributions, by any other means than by 
				taxes on consumption. In populous cities, it may be enough the 
				subject of conjecture, to occasion the oppression of 
				individuals, without much aggregate benefit to the State; but 
				beyond these circles, it must, in a great measure, escape the 
				eye and the hand of the tax-gatherer. As the necessities of the 
				State, nevertheless, must be satisfied in some mode or other, 
				the defect of other resources must throw the principal weight of 
				public burdens on the possessors of land. And as, on the other 
				hand, the wants of the government can never obtain an adequate 
				supply, unless all the sources of revenue are open to its 
				demands, the finances of the community, under such 
				embarrassments, cannot be put into a situation consistent with 
				its respectability or its security. Thus we shall not even have 
				the consolations of a full treasury, to atone for the oppression 
				of that valuable class of the citizens who are employed in the 
				cultivation of the soil. But public and private distress will 
				keep pace with each other in gloomy concert; and unite in 
				deploring the infatuation of those counsels which led to 
				disunion.
 
 PUBLIUS.
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