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						| Back | Federalist 
						No. 74 The Command of the Military 
						and Naval Forces, and the Pardoning Power of the 
						Executive
 From the New York Packet Tuesday, March 25, 1788.
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				| Author: Alexander Hamilton 
 To the People of the State of New York:
 
 THE President of the United States is to be ``commander-in-chief 
				of the army and navy of the United States, and of the militia of 
				the several States WHEN CALLED INTO THE ACTUAL SERVICE of the 
				United States.'' The propriety of this provision is so evident 
				in itself, and it is, at the same time, so consonant to the 
				precedents of the State constitutions in general, that little 
				need be said to explain or enforce it. Even those of them which 
				have, in other respects, coupled the chief magistrate with a 
				council, have for the most part concentrated the military 
				authority in him alone. Of all the cares or concerns of 
				government, the direction of war most peculiarly demands those 
				qualities which distinguish the exercise of power by a single 
				hand. The direction of war implies the direction of the common 
				strength; and the power of directing and employing the common 
				strength, forms a usual and essential part in the definition of 
				the executive authority.
 
 ``The President may require the opinion, in writing, of the 
				principal officer in each of the executive departments, upon any 
				subject relating to the duties of their respective officers.'' 
				This I consider as a mere redundancy in the plan, as the right 
				for which it provides would result of itself from the office.
 
 He is also to be authorized to grant ``reprieves and pardons for 
				offenses against the United States, EXCEPT IN CASES OF 
				IMPEACHMENT.'' Humanity and good policy conspire to dictate, 
				that the benign prerogative of pardoning should be as little as 
				possible fettered or embarrassed. The criminal code of every 
				country partakes so much of necessary severity, that without an 
				easy access to exceptions in favor of unfortunate guilt, justice 
				would wear a countenance too sanguinary and cruel. As the sense 
				of responsibility is always strongest, in proportion as it is 
				undivided, it may be inferred that a single man would be most 
				ready to attend to the force of those motives which might plead 
				for a mitigation of the rigor of the law, and least apt to yield 
				to considerations which were calculated to shelter a fit object 
				of its vengeance. The reflection that the fate of a 
				fellow-creature depended on his sole fiat, would naturally 
				inspire scrupulousness and caution; the dread of being accused 
				of weakness or connivance, would beget equal circumspection, 
				though of a different kind. On the other hand, as men generally 
				derive confidence from their numbers, they might often encourage 
				each other in an act of obduracy, and might be less sensible to 
				the apprehension of suspicion or censure for an injudicious or 
				affected clemency. On these accounts, one man appears to be a 
				more eligible dispenser of the mercy of government, than a body 
				of men.
 
 The expediency of vesting the power of pardoning in the 
				President has, if I mistake not, been only contested in relation 
				to the crime of treason. This, it has been urged, ought to have 
				depended upon the assent of one, or both, of the branches of the 
				legislative body. I shall not deny that there are strong reasons 
				to be assigned for requiring in this particular the concurrence 
				of that body, or of a part of it. As treason is a crime levelled 
				at the immediate being of the society, when the laws have once 
				ascertained the guilt of the offender, there seems a fitness in 
				referring the expediency of an act of mercy towards him to the 
				judgment of the legislature. And this ought the rather to be the 
				case, as the supposition of the connivance of the Chief 
				Magistrate ought not to be entirely excluded. But there are also 
				strong objections to such a plan. It is not to be doubted, that 
				a single man of prudence and good sense is better fitted, in 
				delicate conjunctures, to balance the motives which may plead 
				for and against the remission of the punishment, than any 
				numerous body whatever. It deserves particular attention, that 
				treason will often be connected with seditions which embrace a 
				large proportion of the community; as lately happened in 
				Massachusetts. In every such case, we might expect to see the 
				representation of the people tainted with the same spirit which 
				had given birth to the offense. And when parties were pretty 
				equally matched, the secret sympathy of the friends and favorers 
				of the condemned person, availing itself of the good-nature and 
				weakness of others, might frequently bestow impunity where the 
				terror of an example was necessary. On the other hand, when the 
				sedition had proceeded from causes which had inflamed the 
				resentments of the major party, they might often be found 
				obstinate and inexorable, when policy demanded a conduct of 
				forbearance and clemency. But the principal argument for 
				reposing the power of pardoning in this case to the Chief 
				Magistrate is this: in seasons of insurrection or rebellion, 
				there are often critical moments, when a welltimed offer of 
				pardon to the insurgents or rebels may restore the tranquillity 
				of the commonwealth; and which, if suffered to pass unimproved, 
				it may never be possible afterwards to recall. The dilatory 
				process of convening the legislature, or one of its branches, 
				for the purpose of obtaining its sanction to the measure, would 
				frequently be the occasion of letting slip the golden 
				opportunity. The loss of a week, a day, an hour, may sometimes 
				be fatal. If it should be observed, that a discretionary power, 
				with a view to such contingencies, might be occasionally 
				conferred upon the President, it may be answered in the first 
				place, that it is questionable, whether, in a limited 
				Constitution, that power could be delegated by law; and in the 
				second place, that it would generally be impolitic beforehand to 
				take any step which might hold out the prospect of impunity. A 
				proceeding of this kind, out of the usual course, would be 
				likely to be construed into an argument of timidity or of 
				weakness, and would have a tendency to embolden guilt.
 
 PUBLIUS.
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